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Abstract
This paper provides necessary and su±cient conditions for the exis-
tence of a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium in a model of price com-
petition with ¯xed costs. It unveils an interesting and unexplored re-
lationship between Bertrand competition and natural monopoly. That
relationship points out that the non-subadditivity of the cost function
at the output level corresponding to the oligopoly break-even price, de-
noted by D(pL(n)), is su±cient to guarantee that the market supports
a (not necessarily symmetric) Bertrand equilibrium in pure strategies
with two or more ¯rms supplying at least D(pL(n)). Conversely, the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium ensures that the cost function
is not subadditive at every output greater than or equal to D(pL(n)).
JEL Classi¯cation: D43, L13.
Key words: Bertrand competition; cost subadditivity; ¯xed costs;
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1 Introduction
In Industrial Organization, the simplest model of price competition, called
`Bertrand competition' in honor of its initiator Joseph Bertrand, studies the
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1market of a homogenous good in which a small number of ¯rms simulta-
neously post a price and commit to sale the quantity of the ¯rm's product
that consumers demand given those posted prices.
The classical result in the literature on Bertrand competition is the well
known Bertrand's paradox, according to which, if ¯rms are identical, the
average cost is constant, and total revenues are bounded, all Nash equilibria
in the mixed extension of the pricing game are characterized by two or more
¯rms charging the marginal cost (Harrington, 1989).
With unbounded revenues, there are also mixed strategy equilibria in the
game where prices always exceed the marginal cost (Baye and Morgan, 1999;
Kaplan and Wettstein, 2000). However, such equilibria are ruled out by the
usual assumptions on the demand function, namely, continuity and a ¯nite
choke-o® price. Thus, under reasonable market conditions, the message
coming out from Bertrand competition is that the perfectly competitive
outcome, with price equal to marginal cost and zero equilibrium pro¯ts, is
achieved independently of the number of ¯rms in the market.1
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest for reexamining the
Bertrand's paradox under di®erent cost conditions. A remarkable work in
this literature is o®ered by Dastidar (1995), who showed that with an in-
creasing average cost, consistent with decreasing returns production technol-
ogy, the paradox does not hold. To be precise, Dastidar proved that, if ¯rms
have identical, continuous, and convex cost functions, price competition µ a la
Bertrand typically leads to multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria.2 If the
costs are su±ciently convex, even the joint pro¯t-maximizing price can be
in the range of equilibrium prices; and, it may be actually easier to achieve
that outcome when there are more ¯rms in the market (Dastidar, 2001).
The driving force behind the existence of multiple pure strategy equilib-
ria in Bertrand competition with convex costs is easy to picture. Since the
average cost increases too fast, each ¯rm has an incentive to avoid being the
only ¯rm charging the lowest price and supplying the whole market. This
explains why undercutting the other ¯rms is not pro¯table in equilibrium
even if they price above the marginal cost.
1If ¯rms cannot observe their rivals' costs, Spulber (1995) showed that all ¯rms pricing
above the marginal cost and getting positive expected pro¯ts is an equilibrium. However,
as the number of ¯rms increases, equilibrium prices converge to the average cost.
2If ¯rms have asymmetric costs, a pure strategy equilibrium always exists; it could be
unique or not; and in any such equilibrium ¯rms with positive sales charge the same price.
2The same force also operates in the mixed extension. Therefore, under
decreasing returns to scale, there is not only multiple pure strategy equi-
libria, but also a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria with continuous
support (Hoernig, 2002). Further, any ¯nite set of equilibrium prices that
lead to positive equilibrium pro¯ts can be supported in a mixed strategy
equilibrium. Unbounded returns are not necessary to derive this result.
Interestingly, the set of Nash equilibria becomes suddenly smaller if ¯rms
can cooperate in the pricing game. To elaborate, if ¯rms possess an identical
and increasing average cost, Bertrand competition admits a unique and sym-
metric coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Chowdhury and Sengupta, 2004).
The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of ¯rms; and, in the limit,
it converges to the competitive price. On the other hand, if ¯rms have
asymmetric costs and they share the market according to the competitive
supply of each ¯rm, a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium always exists. The
minimum price charged in any equilibrium where ¯rms do not use weakly
dominated strategies is above the competitive price; but, it converges to the
marginal cost as the number of ¯rms increases.3
Regarding Bertrand competition with decreasing average costs, the lit-
erature argues that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is problematic. In-
deed, if the cost function is concave, Dastidar (2006) has recently shown that
under the standard `equal sharing' tie-breaking rule, which roughly means
that consumers split equally among the ¯rms that charge the lowest price,
Bertrand competition does not possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies.4 The existence of mixed strategy equilibria remains an open question.5
Since oligopoly theory is most relevant in markets with signi¯cant scale
economies, Shapiro (1989, pgs. 344-345) reckoned that the nonexistence of
equilibria is a serious drawback of the model.
By contrast, the model admits a Nash equilibrium if prices vary over a
grid. For instance, in a symmetric duopoly with linear demand, a constant
3The limiting properties of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria contrast with
those of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In e®ect, if the average cost is increasing,
Novshek and Chowdhury (2003) have shown that the limit set of pure equilibrium prices
includes the competitive price, but it is not a singleton.
4Under the less common `winner-take-all' tie-breaking rule, a zero pro¯t Nash equilib-
rium exists if and only if the monopoly pro¯t function has an initial break-even price. In
addition, if the function is left lower semi-continuous and bounded from above, the zero
pro¯t's outcome is unique (Baye and Morgan, 1999).
5Hoernig (2007, pg. 582) o®ers an example with increasing returns to scale and the
equal sharing rule where neither pure nor mixed strategy equilibria exist.
3marginal cost, and an avoidable ¯xed cost, Chaudhuri (1996) showed that
in the limit, as the size of the grid becomes very small, there is a unique
equilibrium with a single ¯rm pricing at the average cost, supplying the
whole market, and earning zero pro¯ts. This result has been extended later
on by Chowdhury (2002) to the case with asymmetric ¯rms, ¯nding that as
the size of the grid approaches zero, the equilibrium prices converge to the
limit-pricing outcome where the price charged by the most e±cient ¯rm is
just low enough to prevent entry.
Surprisingly, the analysis of Bertrand competition under the more famil-
iar case of U-shaped average costs has not received much attention in the
literature. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers that deal
with this matter. The ¯rst article, due to Novshek and Chowdhury (2003),
¯nds that as the market becomes large the equilibrium set is empty for some
parameter values, and it comprises a whole interval of prices for others. The
lower bound of this interval is bounded away from the minimum average
cost. No conditions are provided to guarantee equilibrium existence.
The second article, due to Yano (2006a), studies a pricing game with a
more complex set of strategies. Speci¯cally, the strategy of each ¯rm is a
paring of a unit price and the set of quantities that the ¯rm is indi®erent
to sell at that unit price.6 When the total amount that buyers wish to
acquire at a given price is di®erent from the amount that ¯rms o®er to
sell at that price, each agent on the long side gets to trade proportionately
to the amount that he desires in such a way that the equilibrium between
demand and supply is reestablished. Yano argues that, by incorporating this
rationing process, the resulting pricing game may be thought of as belonging
to the family of Bertrand-Edgeworth price games.7 Several equilibria arise in
this framework, including the standard equilibrium in Bertrand competition
and the contestable outcome (see also Yano, 2006b).
Taking Dastidar (1995) as a benchmark for our analysis, in this paper we
reexamine price competition in a homogenous good market with U-shaped
average costs. Like Dastidar, we suppose that the total cost function C(¢)
exhibits an increasing marginal cost. However, following Grossman (1981),
we assume that the total cost is given by the sum of a continuous and con-
6The ¯rm is indi®erent between any two quantities at a given price if they give rise to
the same pro¯t.
7For the di®erence between Bertrand and Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, see Vives
(1999, Chap. 5).
4vex variable cost function, V C(¢), and a ¯xed cost, F ¸ 0. Telser (1991)
calls this type of markets, with a U-shaped average cost curve, `Viner in-
dustries'. Since we do not restrict a priori the nature of the ¯xed cost, the
paper accommodates cases where the ¯xed cost is (i) completely avoidable,
(ii) partially avoidable, and (iii) unavoidable, in which case our model co-
incides with Dastidar's (1995). In contrast with what happens in the latter
case, the cost functions corresponding to the ¯rst two situations su®er from
discontinuities and non-convexities around the origin, making the analysis
of equilibrium existence a nontrivial matter.
Within the framework brie°y depicted above, this paper investigates
necessary and su±cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. When the ¯xed cost is fully avoidable, we ¯nd an interesting
relationship between Bertrand competition and cost subadditivity.8 That re-
lationship says that the non-subadditivity of the cost function at the output
level corresponding to the oligopoly break-even price, denoted by D(pL(n)),
is su±cient to guarantee that the market supports a (not necessarily sym-
metric) equilibrium in pure strategies with two or more ¯rms supplying at
least D(pL(n)). Conversely, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium en-
sures that the cost function is not subadditive at every output greater than
or equal to D(pL(n)). As a by-product, the latter implies that the average
cost is not decreasing over the mentioned range of outputs.
In addition, this work also reconsiders under the cost conditions speci-
¯ed above the relationship between Bertrand equilibrium and price-taking
or competitive equilibrium. We ¯nd that the latter is su±cient but not nec-
essary for Bertrand competition to possess an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Thus, given that in our framework a price-taking equilibrium always exists
when the ¯xed cost is fully unavoidable, we derive as a corollary from the
previous statement an existence result for the case with decreasing returns
to scale much simpler than Dastidar (1995).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and the equilibrium concept, referred to as Bertrand equilibrium.
Section 3 deals with the relationship between price-taking equilibria and
Bertrand equilibria. Section 4 contains the main results of this article, asso-
8A cost function C(¢) is subadditive at q 2 R if the cost of producing q with a single
¯rm is smaller than the sum of the costs of producing it separately with a group of two
or more identical ¯rms. As Baumol (1977) pointed out, subadditivity of the cost function
is a necessary and su±cient condition for natural monopoly.
5ciating the existence of Bertrand equilibria with the non-subadditivity of the
cost function. For expositional convenience, some of the proofs of Section
4 as well as an example of the model are displayed in the Appendix, which
appears at the end of the paper. Final remarks are done in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider the market of a homogenous good, with a unit price P and an ag-
gregate demand D(P). Let N = f1;2;:::;ng, n ¸ 2, be the set of ¯rms op-
erating in the market. Suppose each ¯rm i 2 N competes for the market de-
mand D(¢) by simultaneously and independently proposing to the costumers
a price pi from the interval [0;1). Let qi = qi(pi;p¡i) denote ¯rm i's output
supply as a function of (pi;p¡i), where p¡i = (p1;:::;pi¡1;pi+1;:::;pn) is
the list of prices chosen by the other ¯rms.
The following assumptions complete the description of the model.
Assumption 1 The aggregate demand D(¢) is bounded on R+; that is,
there exist K > 0 and P > 0 such that D(0) = K and D(P) = 0 for all
P ¸ P. In addition, D(¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable and decreasing
on (0;P); i.e., 8P 2 (0;P), D0(P) < 0.
Assumption 2 For each ¯rm i 2 N, the production cost associated with
any output level qi 2 R+ is given by
C(qi) =
(
V C(qi) + F if qi > 0,
C(0) if qi = 0,
where F ¸ 0 represents a ¯xed cost, C(0) 2 [0;F], and V C(¢) is a vari-
able cost function, which is twice continuously di®erentiable, increasing and
convex on R+, with V C(0) = 0 and 0 · V C0(0) < P.
Although Assumption 2 does not specify the nature of the ¯xed cost,
which is determined by the value of C(0), in the rest of the paper we consider
two possibilities. The ¯rst case takes place when C(0) = F, which means
that the ¯xed cost F is unavoidable. The second possibility occurs when F
is positive and C(0) 2 [0;F), implying that the ¯xed cost can be completely
or partially avoided by producing no output. In contrast with the ¯rst case,
which has been studied in Dastidar (1995), in the second the cost function
6C(¢) is not only discontinuous but also non-convex around the origin. As we
explain in Section 3, these two scenarios result in quite di®erent predictions
regarding the existence of Nash equilibria in Bertrand competition.
Our next assumption determines the individual demand faced by each
¯rm for every possible pro¯le of prices. To do that, we adopt the standard
market sharing rule used in the literature on price competition, according
to which the market demand is equally split between the ¯rms that charge
the lowest price, and the remaining ¯rms sell nothing.9
Assumption 3 For each ¯rm i 2 N and every (pi;p¡i) 2 [0;1)n, the





D(pi) if pi < pj 8j 2 Nnfig,
D(pi)
m if pi · pj 8j & pi = pkt 8t = 1;:::;m ¡ 1,
0 if pi > pj for some j 2 Nnfig.
(1)
As is usually the case in Bertrand competition, we assume that each ¯rm
always meets all its demand at the price it has announced. Formally,
Assumption 4 For all i 2 N, and all (pi;p¡i) 2 [0;1)n, qi(pi;p¡i) =
di(pi;p¡i).










Assumption 5 For each m 2 N, H(¢;m) is strictly quasi-concave on
(0;P), with ph(m) = arg max
p2(0;P)
H(p;m); and, for all m 6= 1, 0 <
H(ph(m);m) < H(pM;1), where pM = ph(1).
Assumption 5 guarantees that, for every m 2 N, H(¢;m) has an interior
maximum. This is because H(0;m) = ¡V C(K=m)¡F < 0 and H(P;m) =
¡C(0) · 0. In addition, it also ensures that the monopoly obtains the
greatest maximal bene¯ts.
The model of price competition described above follows Dastidar
(1995).10 The only di®erence is that in our framework F is a ¯xed cost which
9For price competition under alternative sharing rules, see among others Baye and
Morgan (2002), Dastidar (2006), and a recent article by Hoernig (2007).
10See Appendix A.1 for an example of the model with two ¯rms and a linear demand.
7may or may not be avoided by producing zero output. On the contrary, in
Dastidar (1995) only unavoidable ¯xed costs are considered, although it
is not explicitly stated in that way. Apart from this, the two models are
similar.
Let ¼i(pi;p¡i) = pi di(pi;p¡i)¡C(di(pi;p¡i)) be ¯rm i's pro¯t function.
We denote by Gn = h[0;1); ¼iii2N the price competition game de¯ned by
Assumptions 1 { 4. A pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium (PSBE) for
Gn is a pro¯le of prices (pi;p¡i) 2 [0;1)n such that, for each i 2 N and all
^ pi 2 [0;1), ¼i(pi;p¡i) ¸ ¼i(^ pi;p¡i). We denote by B(Gn) the set of all such
equilibria, and by S(Gn) µ B(Gn) the subset of symmetric pure strategy
equilibria, where for all (p1;:::;pn) 2 S(Gn) and all i;j 2 N, pi = pj.
3 Price-taking and Bertrand equilibria
We begin this section by showing that, independently of the nature of the
¯xed cost, the existence of a price-taking equilibrium (yet to be de¯ned) in
the homogenous good market described in Section 2 is a su±cient condition
for a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium to exist.
To do that, let En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i represent the homogenous good
market where every ¯rm i 2 N maximizes the function ¦i(P;Qi) = P Qi ¡
C(Qi) with respect to Qi 2 R+ taking the price P > 0 as given. Suppose
as before that D(¢) and C(¢) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively. A




+ with the property that, for each ¯rm i 2 N,
QC







i = D(PC): (3)
Notice that, by Assumption 2, for all i 2 N and any PC 2 (0;P),
¦i(PC;Qi) = PC Qi ¡ C(Qi) is concave on Qi 2 R++, and ¦i(PC;0) =
PC 0 ¡ C(0) = ¡C(0). Hence, a unique output QC
i 2 R+ satisfying (2)
always exists. Moreover, since ¯rms are identical, QC
1 = ::: = QC
n. Denote
this common value by QC. By equation (3), QC = D(PC)=n. Hence,
abusing the notation, in what follows we denote a PTE by the pair (PC;QC).
8Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1{4 hold. If (PC;QC) is a price-taking
equilibrium for En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i, then (p1;:::;pn) = (PC;:::;PC) is a
pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium for Gn = h[0;1); ¼iii2N.
Proof Let (PC;QC) be a PTE for En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i, where PC 2 (0;P)
and QC = D(PC)=n. By Assumption 1, QC > 0. Therefore, (2) im-
plies that PC QC ¡ C(QC) ¸ PC 0 ¡ C(0) = ¡C(0). Consider the
game Gn = h[0;1); ¼iii2N and the strategy pro¯le pC = (PC;:::;PC).







Hence, for all i 2 N, ¼i(PC;:::;PC) ¸ ¡C(0). Suppose, by contra-
diction, pC 62 B(Gn). Then, there must exist a ¯rm i 2 N and a
price ^ pi 2 [0;1) such that ¼i(^ pi;pC
¡i) > ¼i(PC;pC
¡i). If ^ pi > PC, then
di(^ pi;pC
¡i) = 0, meaning that ¼i(^ pi;pC
¡i) = ^ pi 0 ¡ C(0) = ¡C(0), which
stands in contradiction with the fact that ¼i(^ pi;pC
¡i) > ¼i(PC;pC
¡i). There-
fore, ^ pi < PC; and, by (1), di(^ pi;pC
¡i) = D(^ pi) > 0. If ^ pi = 0, then
^ qi = K and ¼i(^ pi;pC
¡i) = ¡C(K) < ¡C(0), a contradiction. Thus,
^ pi > 0. Let ^ Qi = argmaxQ2R+ ¦i(^ pi;Q). Note that, since ^ pi < PC,
¦i(^ pi; ^ Qi) = maxQ2R+f^ pi ¢ Q ¡ C(Q)g · maxQ2R+fPC ¢ Q ¡ C(Q)g =
¦i(PC;QC). However, ¦i(PC;QC) = ¼i(PC;pC
¡i) < ¼i(^ pi;pC
¡i). There-
fore, maxQ2R+f^ pi ¢ Q ¡ C(Q)g < ^ pi ¢ D(^ pi) ¡ C(D(^ pi)), a contradiction.
Thus, (PC;:::;PC) 2 B(Gn).
The previous proposition shows that the existence of a price-taking equi-
librium in a homogenous good market, with a ¯nite number of identical ¯rms
and demand and cost functions that satisfy our assumptions, is su±cient to
guarantee the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium when ¯rms compete
in prices µ a la Bertrand, instead of taking the market price as given.
A similar result has been previously stated in Vives (1999, pg. 120) for
the case where ¯rms have identical, increasing, smooth, and convex costs.
The contribution of Proposition 1 is to show that the claim is also valid in
markets with ¯xed costs, regardless of whether the ¯xed cost is unavoidable
or (totally or partially) avoidable.11 A direct implication is therefore that
in our framework the continuity and convexity around the origin of the cost
function C(¢) are not required to derive the result in question.
11This paper allows F to be equal to 0. Thus, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 below also
hold in the more familiar case with decreasing returns to scale and no ¯xed cost.
9A second and perhaps more interesting implication obtained from Propo-
sition 1 is summarized in Corollary 1 below. This corollary o®ers an exis-
tence result for the case analyzed in Dastidar (1995) that is simpler and more
intuitive than the existing one. In short, it shows that when the ¯xed cost
is unavoidable a price-taking equilibrium always exists and, consequently,
that the set of symmetric pure strategy Bertrand equilibria is nonempty.12
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 1{4 hold. If the ¯xed cost is unavoidable,
then the set of symmetric pure strategy equilibria S(Gn) is nonempty.
Proof Consider the homogenous good market En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i intro-
duced above, where each ¯rm i 2 N maximizes ¦i(P;Qi) with respect to
Qi 2 R+ taking the price P > 0 as given. Suppose that C(0) = F. We wish
to prove that En has a PTE.
Fix any price P 2 (0;P) and any ¯rm i 2 N, and let Q¤
i(P) =
argmaxQi>0 ¦i(P;Qi). By Assumption 2, Q¤
i(P) exists and is unique (recall
that ¦i(P; ¢) is concave on R++). Moreover, using the ¯rst order condition,
Q¤
i(P) = MC¡1(P), where MC¡1(¢) denotes the inverse of V C0(¢), which











¡ F > ¡F = ¦i(P;0);
because by the ¯rst order condition, P = V C0(Q¤






i (P) . Therefore, for every price P 2 (0;P) and
every ¯rm i 2 N, the optimal output supply of i at P is given by Q¤
i(P) =




We can now calculate the equilibrium price by solving the equation
D(P) = n[MC¡1(P)], which has a solution on (0;P) due to our as-
sumptions on the demand and cost functions. Denote this value by P¤.
Clearly, (P¤;Q¤
i(P¤)) is a PTE for En. Hence, by Proposition 1, the pro¯le
(p1;:::;pn) = (P¤;:::;P¤) 2 S(Gn).
The reader may now wonder whether or not the existence result stated
in Corollary 1 can be extended to the case where the ¯xed is avoidable.
12Actually, the set of symmetric PSBE is typically a whole interval of prices. For
experimental evidence regarding this result, see Klaus and Brandts (2008).
10Unfortunately, the answer to that query is that it is relatively simple to con-
struct examples where neither a price-taking equilibrium nor a pure strat-
egy Bertrand equilibrium exist. In Appendix A.1 we analyze in detail one
of these examples. We show that in a duopoly with linear demand and
quadratic variable costs, if the ¯xed cost can be completely avoided by pro-
ducing no output, then depending upon its value the set of pure strategy
Bertrand equilibria may be empty.13
The example discussed in the appendix is also useful to illustrate that,
in our framework with a U-shaped average cost curve, Baye and Morgan's
(1999) condition, namely, the existence of an initial break-even price in the
monopoly pro¯t function H(¢;1), is not enough to rule out the nonexis-
tence of equilibria. Thus, a sensible question to ask is what conditions (if
any) prevent this from happening. Finding these conditions will occupy the
remainder of the paper.
4 Cost subadditivity and Bertrand equilibrium
To begin the analysis of the problem pointed out above requires us to de¯ne
a key property of the cost function, namely, subadditivity. Following Panzar
(1989, pg. 23), we say that a cost function C(¢) is subadditive at q 2 R+
if for every list of outputs q1;:::;qn, with qi 2 R+ and qi 6= q for all




i=1 qi = q.
In words, C(¢) is subadditive at q if the cost of producing q with a
single ¯rm is smaller than the sum of the costs of producing it separately
with a group of two or more identical ¯rms. As Baumol (1977) noted, this
property is a necessary and su±cient condition for a natural monopoly to
exist. However, subadditivity is a local property, in the sense that it refers
to a particular point on the cost curve. Thus, it is possible for a market to
be a natural monopoly for a certain output level but not for others.
When the cost function C(¢) is twice di®erentiable and the marginal
cost is increasing, there is a simple necessary condition for subadditivity. In
e®ect, under these conditions, any output q is divided in positive portions
13When the marginal cost is constant, this problem has been noted by Shapiro (1989),
Vives (1999) and Baye and Kovenock (2008). In fact, Baye and Kovenock (2008) showed
that, with a constant marginal cost, a fully avoidable ¯xed cost may preclude the existence
of mixed strategy equilibria too. The di®erence with our example is that we consider a
U-shaped average cost, whereas in the previous references the average cost is decreasing.
11most cheaply among n identical ¯rms if each ¯rm produces the same amount
qi = q=n. Hence, since the minimized cost corresponding to output q for the
n-¯rm market is
Pn
i=1 C(qi) = nC(q=n), it follows that C(¢) is subadditive
at q 2 R+ only if C(q) < nC(q=n). If there are only two ¯rms, this con-
dition is also su±cient, since the requirement embedded in the de¯nition of
subadditivity that qi 6= q 8i 2 N implies, when n = 2, that qi 6= 08i = 1;2.
We claim below in Proposition 2 that if the ¯xed cost is avoidable, then a
necessary condition for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy Bertrand
equilibrium is for the cost function not to be subadditive at the total demand
corresponding to the n-¯rm oligopoly break-even price (yet to be de¯ned).
As we will immediately see, the proof of Proposition 2 relies on three
preliminary results, which are summarized for convenience in Lemmas 1, 2,
and 3, respectively. The ¯rst of these lemmas shows that regardless of the
number of ¯rms in the market, there is always a price with positive demand
such that, if the ¯rms share the market equally at that price, then each of
them is indi®erent between staying in operation and exit the market.
Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. For every m 2 N, there is a
price ^ p(m) 2 (0;ph(m)) such that H(^ p(m); m) = ¡C(0).
Proof Fix any m 2 N. By Assumptions 1 and 2, H(0;m) = ¡V C(K=m)¡
F. Thus, H(0;m) < ¡F; and, since C(0) · F, we have that H(0;m) <
¡C(0). On the other hand, by Assumption 5, H(ph(m);m) > 0 ¸ ¡C(0).
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a price ^ p(m) 2 (0;ph(m))
such that H(^ p(m); m) = ¡C(0).
Fix now any number of ¯rms m 2 N, and let pL(m) = minf^ p(m) 2
(0;P) : H(^ p(m); m) = ¡C(0)g. By Lemma 1, pL(m) is well de¯ned. By
Assumption 1, D(pL(m)) > 0. Our next result says that for any possible
number of ¯rms m 2 N the corresponding break-even price pL(m) is lower
than or equal to the monopoly pro¯t-maximizing price pM.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. For each m 2 N, pL(m) · pM.
Proof See Appendix A.2
Finally, our last preliminary result demonstrates that whenever the set
of symmetric pure strategy Bertrand equilibria is nonempty, the oligopoly
break-even price pL(n) belongs to that set.
12Lemma 3 Let Assumptions 1{5 hold. If S(Gn) 6= ;, then the strategy pro-
¯le (p1;:::;pn) = (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) 2 S(Gn).
Proof See Appendix A.3
We are now ready to state Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1{5 hold and suppose that C(0) = 0. If
the set of symmetric pure strategy equilibrium S(Gn) is nonempty, then the
cost function C(¢) is not subadditive at D(pL(n)).
Proof Assume, by contradiction, that C(¢) is subadditive at D(pL(n)). (Re-
call that D(pL(n)) > 0.) Then, it must be that producing D(pL(n)) with a







Adding the term ¡pL(n)D(pL(n)) to both sides of (4), we have that






which can be rewritten as












By the de¯nition of pL(n), the right hand side of (5) is equal to ¡nC(0).
Hence, since C(0) = 0, (5) implies that pL(n)D(pL(n)) ¡ V C(D(pL(n))) ¡
F > 0. By the continuity of pD(p) ¡ V C(D(p)) ¡ F in p at pL(n), there
exists a price p0 < pL(n) such that p0 D(p0) ¡ V C(D(p0)) ¡ F > 0. Fix
any ¯rm i 2 N, and consider ¯rm i's strategy p0







On the other hand, ¼i(pL(n);:::;pL(n)) = H(pL(n);n) = 0. Thus, ¯rm i
can pro¯tably deviate from pL(n) to p0
i at (pL(n);(pL(n))¡i), contradicting
that, by Lemma 3, the pro¯le (pL(n);(pL(n))¡i) 2 S(Gn). Therefore, C(¢)
is not subadditive at D(pL(n)).
Proposition 2 formalizes the intuitive idea that, if the ¯xed cost is avoid-
able (or, there is no ¯xed cost at all), then a necessary condition for the
13existence of a symmetric pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium in a homoge-
nous good market is for the market not to be a natural monopoly at the
output level corresponding to the oligopoly break-even price.14
What about the converse of Proposition 2? Can we say that the nonex-
istence of a natural monopoly at the oligopoly break-even price is also suf-
¯cient for S(Gn) 6= ;? As we argue in Proposition 3, the answer to this
question is a±rmative if there is a price-taking equilibrium in the market,
because in that case Proposition 1 ensures that the set of symmetric pure
strategy equilibria is always nonempty.
More interestingly, the converse of Proposition 2 also holds in a duopoly,
independently of the nature of the ¯xed cost (i.e., regardless of the value of
C(0)). The reason behind this result is found in the next lemma.






then the pro¯le (p1;:::;pn) = (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) constitutes a pure strategy
Bertrand equilibrium for Gn.
Proof Suppose, by contradiction, (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) 62 S(Gn). Then, there
must be a price ~ p 2 (0;pL(n)) such that H(~ p;1) > ¡C(0) = H(pL(n);n).
By the de¯nition of pL(n), D(pL(n)) > 0. Thus, the hypothesis in Lemma





, can be rewritten as





+ (n ¡ 1)F: (6)
Using the de¯nition of pL(n), it is easy to see that the right hand side
of (6) is equal to
pL(n)D(pL(n)) ¡ F + nC(0): (7)
Hence, substituting (7) into (6), it follows that H(pL(n);1) · ¡C(0).
However, this contradicts that, by Assumption 5, H(¢;1) is quasi-concave
on (0;P), because pL(n) 2 (~ p;pM) and H(pL(n);1) · ¡C(0) <
minfH(~ p;1); H(pM;1)g.
Overall Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 allow us to state the following result:
14This result does not hold if C(0) 6= 0. In e®ect, suppose that n = 3 and that






2 if qi > 0, and C(0) =
15
2 . Routine calculations
show that pL(3) =
10








is a PSBE. However, C(¢) is subadditive at D(10=23), because C(D(10=23)) ¼ 19:98,
2C(D(10=23)=2) ¼ 21:24, and 3C(D(10=23)=3) ¼ 26:66.
14Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1{5 hold and suppose that either (PC;QC)
is a price-taking equilibrium for En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i, or that there are only
two ¯rms in the market. Then, if C(¢) is not subadditive at D(pL(n)), the
set of symmetric pure strategy equilibria S(Gn) is nonempty.
Proof If (PC;QC) is a PTE for En = hN;D(¢);C(¢)i, then the desired
result follows from Proposition 1. On the other hand, if n = 2, then C(¢)






Hence, by Lemma 4, (pL(2);pL(2)) 2 S(G2).
In words, Proposition 3 indicates that if the homogenous good market
is not a natural monopoly and either (i) there is a price-taking equilibrium,
or (ii) there are exactly two ¯rms, then the market supports a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium where ¯rms compete in prices µ a la Bertrand and
supply a total output that leaves each of them indi®erent between staying
in operation and exit the market. In particular, this result holds when the
market has an unavoidable ¯xed cost, since in that case a PTE always exists.
By contrast, if there are more than two ¯rms and the ¯xed cost is com-
pletely or partially avoidable, then the result in Proposition 3 is no longer
valid. To illustrate, consider the demand and the cost function correspond-
ing to the example analyzed in Appendix A.1. That is, let D(P) = 10 ¡ P
and suppose that C(qi) = 1=2q2
i + F if qi > 0, and that C(0) = 0. As-
sume n = 5 and F = 4:3. Then, pL(5) ¼ 4:3983 and H(pL(5);1) ¼ 4:65 >
0 = H(pL(5);5). Therefore, (p1;:::;p5) = (pL(5);:::;pL(5)) is not a PSBE
for G5; and, by Lemma 3, we can conclude that S(G5) = ;. However, it
is easy to verify in this numerical example that C(¢) is not subadditive at
D(pL(5)) ¼ 5:6017. Indeed, producing D(pL(5)) with a single ¯rm gener-
ates a cost equal to C(D(pL(5))) ¼ 19;9895, whereas producing it with two
identical ¯rms costs 2 ¢ C(D(pL(5))=2) ¼ 16:4447.
So, is there anything to say about Bertrand competition when the n-
¯rm market is not a natural monopoly and there is no price-taking equilib-
rium? Indeed, we show next that, if the ¯xed cost is avoidable, then the
non-subadditivity of the cost function C(¢) at D(pL(n)) is su±cient to guar-
antee that the market supports a (not necessarily symmetric) pure strategy
Bertrand equilibrium where two or more identical ¯rms jointly supply at
least D(pL(n)). And, conversely, the existence of a pure strategy Bertrand
equilibrium ensures that the market is not a natural monopoly at every out-
15put greater than or equal to D(pL(n)). In particular, the latter implies that
the average cost is not decreasing on [D(pL(n));K), (see Corollary 2 below
and the discussion following that result).
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1{5 hold and suppose C(0) = 0. If the cost
function C(¢) is not subadditive at D(pL(n)), then there exist a pure strat-
egy Bertrand equilibrium (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn) where
P
i2N qi(p1;:::;pn) ¸
D(pL(n)). Conversely, if a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium exists, then
the cost function C(¢) is not subadditive over [D(pL(n));K).
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Given any output q > 0, the average cost at q is de¯ned as AC(q) =
C(q)=q. The average cost function AC(¢) is decreasing at q if there exists a
± > 0 such that for all q0;q00 2 (q ¡±;q+±), with q0 < q00, AC(q00) < AC(q0).
Additionally, AC(¢) is said to decrease through q if for all q0;q00 2 (0;q], with
q0 < q00, AC(q00) < AC(q0), (Panzar, 1989, pg. 24). If, like in our case, C(¢)
is twice continuously di®erentiable on R++, then (i) AC(¢) is decreasing at
q if
@AC(q)
@q < 0; and (ii) AC(¢) is decreasing through q if for all q0 2 (0;q],
@AC(q0)
@q < 0, (i.e., if AC(¢) is decreasing on (0;q]).
Lemma 5 If the average cost AC(¢) is decreasing through q, then the cost
function C(¢) is subadditive at q, but not conversely.
Proof See Appendix A.5.
Corollary 2 Let Assumptions 1{5 hold and suppose C(0) = 0. The set of
pure strategy Bertrand equilibria B(Gn) is nonempty only if the average cost
AC(¢) is not decreasing on [D(pL(n));K).
Proof Immediate from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5.
The second part of Theorem 1 and its implication in Corollary 2 are
closely related with Dastidar's (2006) Proposition 3, which says that the set
of Bertrand equilibria B(Gn) is nonempty only if C(¢) is not concave. Hence,
before closing this section, it may be worthy to underline some di®erences
between these results.
First of all, let's emphasize that the necessary condition for equilibrium
existence stated in the second part of Theorem 1 considerably sharpens
16Dastidar's (2006) condition, because concavity implies subadditivity, but
not conversely. Thus, we could have a cost function which is non-concave
and subadditive at the same time. A function like that would violate our
necessary condition for existence, whereas it wouldn't do so with Dastidar's.
Secondly, in Theorem 1 we allow for avoidable ¯xed costs and, therefore, for
discontinuities in the cost function around the origin. On the contrary, in
Dastidar (2006) the cost function is continuous and F = 0. Finally, Theorem
1 provides not only a necessary condition for B(Gn) 6= ;, but also a su±cient
condition. Instead, Dastidar (2006) only o®ers a necessary condition.
5 Final remarks
The main contributions of this article can be summarized by restating
Propositions 1, 2 and 3, and Theorem 1. By looking at Proposition 1 (and
the example in Section A.1) we see that in a market with convex variable
costs and ¯xed costs, the existence of a price-taking equilibrium is su±cient
but not necessary for a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium to exist.15
This work relates the existence of Bertrand equilibria with the nonexis-
tence of natural monopoly. In Proposition 2, we show that if the ¯xed cost
is avoidable and there is a symmetric PSBE, then the cost function is not
subadditive at the total demand corresponding to the oligopoly break-even
price pL(n). This is equivalent to say that, under the previous conditions,
the market cannot be a natural monopoly at D(pL(n)). As Proposition 3
posits, the reverse of that statement is also true if there are exactly two
¯rms or if there is a PTE. Numerical examples con¯rm, however, that the
converse of Proposition 2 does not hold in other cases.
The last and the most important result of this paper is found Theorem
1, which generalizes Propositions 2 and 3 to markets with more than two
¯rms and without a price-taking equilibrium. Theorem 1 shows that, when
the ¯xed cost is avoidable and the cost function C(¢) is not subadditive
at D(pL(n)), there always exists a Bertrand equilibrium in pure strategies,
though it need not be a symmetric one. Conversely, if a pure strategy
equilibrium exists, then C(¢) is not subadditive for all of the output levels
greater than or equal to D(pL(n)).
15Grossman (1981) found a related result, but for a di®erent equilibrium concept. Using
a model similar to ours, he showed that if a PTE exists, then it is a supply function
equilibrium. However, the latter may exist even if there is no PTE in the market.
17As a ¯nal remark, notice that the results of this article could be used to
determine the maximum number of ¯rms that a homogenous good market
can support under price competition. That is, they could be helpful to the
theory of endogenous industry structure. This is because the break-even
price pL(¢) is typically increasing in the number of ¯rms that operate in the
market. Thereby, a cost function could be subadditive at D(pL(n+1)), but
not at D(pL(n)). A more comprehensive analysis of this matter as well as
the study of more general forms of non-convexities and discontinuities in the
cost function are left for a future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Example
Let D(P) = 10 ¡ P and N = f1;2g. Suppose C(qi) = 1=2q2
i + F if qi > 0,
and let C(0) = 0. If a PTE exists, then (2) and (3) imply that PC = 10=3
and QC = 10=3. However, ¦i(PC;QC) ¸ 0 (= ¦i(PC;0)) only if F ·
50=9(¼ 5:55
0
). Thus, if F > 50=9, the market does not possess a PTE.





















Figure 1: Existence of Bertrand equilibria (F = 6)
Regarding Bertrand equilibria, a pair of prices (p¤
1;p¤
2) 2 [0;1)2 consti-
tutes a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium if and only if p¤
1 = p¤
2 and, for all
18i 2 N, (a) H(p¤
i;2) ¸ 0, and (b) for all ^ pi < p¤
i, H(p¤
i;2) ¸ H(^ pi;1). Notice
that the latter condition requires that 1=2p¤
i(10 ¡ p¤
i) ¡ 3=8(10 ¡ p¤
i)2 · 0,
which is satis¯ed whenever p¤
i · 30=7(¼ 4:2858). On the other hand, from
(a), it follows that p¤
i ¸ 6 ¡
p
16 ¡ 8=5F. Hence, a price p¤
i simultaneously
satisfying both conditions exists if and only if F · 400=49(¼ 8:1633).
For instance, when F = 6 the price p¤
i = 4 is a solution for (a) and
(b). Therefore, the pro¯le (p¤
1;p¤
2) = (4;4) 2 S(G2). Actually, if the ¯xed
cost F · 50=9, then the set of symmetric Bertrand equilibria includes the
price-taking equilibrium; that is, (10=3;10=3) 2 S(G2). However, when
F 2 (50=9;400=49), a PTE does not exist, but the game possesses multiple
PSBE. Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, when F = 6 any price between the
lower bound pL = 6 ¡
p
32=5 (¼ 3:4702) and the upper bound pH = 30=7
satis¯es conditions (a) and (b) and, therefore, is part of a symmetric PSBE.



















Figure 2: Nonexistence of Bertrand equilibria ( F = 9)





symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. For F = 9, this is
illustrated in Figure 2, where it can be easily seen that, for any price p for
which the solid curve H(p;2) is over the horizontal axis, the dashed curve
H(p;1) lies above. This implies that, whenever both ¯rms choose any price
p 2 [0;P] satisfying the condition H(p;2) ¸ 0, there is a deviation ^ pi < p
19for one ¯rm, say for ¯rm i, such that H(p;2) < H(^ pi;1).
Finally, observe that when F = 9 our example not only fails to possess
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, but also a PSBE with p1 6= p2.
To see this, assume, by contradiction, such equilibrium exists. Without
loss of generality, suppose that p1 < p2. Notice that p1 · pM = 20=3.
Otherwise, ¯rm 1 can pro¯tably deviate to pM. Then, by Assumption 3,
¼1(p1;p2) = H(p1;1) and ¼2(p1;p2) = 0. Suppose ¯rst H(p1;1) > 0. Then,
q1(p1;p2) > 0; and, by the continuity of H(p;1) = p(10¡p)¡ 1
2 (10¡p)2¡9
in p at p1, there is a price p0
2 < p1 such that H(p0
2;1) > 0 = ¼2(p1;p2),
contradicting that p2 is ¯rm 2's best response to p1.
Next, observe that if (p1;p2) 2 B(G2), then H(p1;1) cannot be negative.
This is because ¼1(10; ^ p2) = 0 for all ^ p2 2 [0;1). Therefore, H(p1;1) = 0;
and, given the shape of H(¢;1) displayed in Figure 2, it has to be that p1 =
(20¡
p
46)=3 (¼ 4:4059). If H(p2;1) > 0, then using the continuity of H(p;1)
in p at p2, there must be a price p0
1 < p2 such that H(p0
1;1) > 0 = ¼1(p1;p2),
which would contradict that ¯rm 1 is playing his best response against p2.
Thus, H(p2;1) · 0. But, since p2 > p1 and H(pM;1) ¼ 7:66
0
> 0, this
implies p2 > pM. Hence, ¯rm 1 can pro¯tably deviate to pM, meaning that
(p1;p2) is not a PSBE for G2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that pL(m) > pM for some m 2 N.
Then, m 6= 1. By Assumption 5, H(¢;1) is non-increasing at pL(m); i.e.,
@H(pL(m);1)
@p · 0. Hence,




Similarly, by Assumption 5 and the fact that, by de¯nition, pL(m) <
ph(m), H(¢;m) is non-decreasing at pL(m); i.e.,
@H(pL(m);m)
@p ¸ 0. Therefore,



















D0(pL(m)) < V C0(D(pL(m)))¡
D(pL(m))
D0(pL(m)); and, by
(8) and (9), we get the desired contradiction.
20A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3, we ¯rst derive the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 6 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For all p < pM, H(p;1) ¡
H(p;n) = 0 implies that
@[H(p;1)¡H(p;n)]
@p > 0.
Proof For every price p < pM, we have that
H(p;1) ¡ H(p;n) =
n ¡ 1
n












D(p) + [p ¡ V C0(D(p))]D0(p)¡
¡
·



















By the convexity of V C(¢),
























Thus, combining (12) and (13), we have that p < V C0(D(p)); and,






Therefore, since (n ¡ 1)=nD(p) > 0 and D0(p) < 0, the right hand side of
(11) is greater than zero; i.e.,
@[H(p;1)¡H(p;n)]
@p > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the strat-
egy pro¯le (p1;:::;pn) = (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) 62 S(Gn). Then, there must
be a ¯rm i 2 N and a price ~ pi < pL(n) such that ¼i(~ pi;(pL(n))¡i) >
¼i(pL(n);(pL(n))¡i), where (pL(n))¡i denotes the sub-pro¯le of prices in
which everybody except ¯rm i chooses pL(n). Notice that ¼i(~ pi;(pL(n))¡i) =
H(~ pi;1) and ¼i(pL(n);(pL(n))¡i) = H(pL(n);n). Thus, H(~ pi;1) ¡
21H(pL(n);n) > 0. Moreover, since H(pL(n);n) = ¡C(0) and H(~ pi;n) <
¡C(0),16 it also follows that H(~ pi;1) ¡ H(~ pi;n) > 0. Therefore, given
that H(0;1) ¡ H(0;n) = ¡V C(K) + V C(K=n) < 0 and H(¢;1) ¡ H(¢;n)
is continuous on [0; ~ pi], there must be a price p0 2 (0; ~ pi) such that
H(p0;1) ¡ H(p0;n) = 0.
Next, recall that, by hypothesis, S(Gn) 6= ;. That is, there is a price
p¤ 2 (pL(n);pM) such that H(p¤;n) ¸ ¡C(0) and, for all p < p¤, H(p;1) ¡
H(p¤;n) · 0. Since p can be chosen arbitrarily close to p¤, by continuity, it
must be that H(p¤;1) ¡ H(p¤;n) · 0. On the other hand, by Assumption
5, H(pM;1) ¡ H(pM;n) > 0. So, there has to be a price p00 2 (pL(n);pM)
such that H(p00;1) ¡ H(p00;n) = 0.
In summary, if S(Gn) 6= ; and (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) 62 S(Gn), the previous
two paragraphs indicate that the curves H(¢;1) and H(¢;n) must inter-
sect each other at least twice on (0;pM). Therefore, in order to show that
(pL(n);:::;pL(n)) is indeed a symmetric pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
for Gn, it is enough to prove that there is only one such intersection; i.e.,
it is su±cient to show that there is a unique price p 2 (0;pM) for which
H(p;1) ¡ H(p;n) = 0.
Without of generality, assume that there is a pair of prices p®;p¯ 2
(0;pM), with p® < p¯, such that H(p®;1) ¡ H(p®;n) = 0 and H(p¯;1) ¡
H(p¯;n) = 0. Notice that, by Lemma 6, for ²1 > 0 small enough, H(p®;1)¡
H(p®;n) = 0 implies that H(p® + ²1;1) ¡ H(p® + ²1;n) > 0. In the same
way, by Lemma 6, for ± > 0 small enough, H(p¯;1) ¡ H(p¯;n) = 0 implies
that H(p¯ ¡ ±;1) ¡ H(p¯ ¡ ±;n) < 0. Hence, since H(¢;1) ¡ H(¢;n) is
continuous on (0;pM), there must be a price p®+1 2 (p®;p¯) such that
H(p®+1;1) ¡ H(p®+1;n) = 0.
Repeating the argument of the previous paragraph, for ²2 > 0 small
enough, H(p®+1;1)¡H(p®+1;n) = 0 implies that H(p®+1+²2;1)¡H(p®+1+
²2;n) > 0. Hence, there must be a price p®+2 2 (p®+1;p¯) such that
H(p®+2;1) ¡ H(p®+2;n) = 0. And using the same reasoning over and over
again, we can construct a sequence of prices fp®+sg1
s=1 ½ (p®;p¯) with the
property that H(p®+s;1) ¡ H(p®+s;n) = 0 for all s = 1;:::;1. Observe
that, by construction, each term p®+s of the sequence is closer to p¯ than
16Note that, H(~ pi;n) 6= ¡C(0) because ~ pi < pL(n) and, by de¯nition, pL(n) is the
smallest price for which H(¢;n) equals ¡C(0). On the other hand, since H(0;n) < ¡C(0),
H(~ pi;n) cannot be greater than ¡C(0). Otherwise, there would be a price p 2 (0; ~ pi) such
that H(p;n) = ¡C(0), contradicting the de¯nition of pL(n). Thus, H(~ pi;n) < ¡C(0).
22what it was p®+s¡1. Therefore, by Lemma 6, for some s ¸ 1 su±ciently
high, there must exist ² 2 (0;±) and a price ¹ ¹ p 2 (p®+s + ²;p¯ ¡ ²) such that
H(¹ ¹ p;1)¡H(¹ ¹ p;n) > 0 and H(¹ ¹ p;1)¡H(¹ ¹ p;n) < 0, which provides the desired
contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, the following auxiliary result will be useful.
Lemma 7 Let Assumptions 1{2 hold. For all p < P,
@[H(p;1)¡mH(p;m)]
@p > 0.
Proof For every p < P, we have that H(p;1)¡mH(p;m) = ¡V C(D(p))¡


















which is positive because D0(p) < 0 and V C0(¢) is increasing.
Proof of Theorem 1 Assume the cost function C(¢) is not subadditive at







If m = n, we are done. By Lemma 4, (p1;:::;pn) = (pL(n);:::;pL(n)) 2
S(Gn) µ B(Gn). Moreover,
P










Adding the term ¡pL(n)D(pL(n)) to both sides of (16), it follows







H(pL(n);1) · mH(pL(n);m): (18)
By following the same argument as above, it is easy to see from (17) that
H(pL(n);1) > nH(pL(n);n): (19)
23Therefore, since C(0) = 0, combining (18) and (19), we get that both
H(pL(n);1) > 0 and mH(pL(n);m) > 0. Further, by Lemma 1, there
is a price p(m) 2 (0;ph(m)) such that H(p(m);m) = 0. Hence, since pL(m)
is the smallest of all such prices, and H(pL(n);m) > 0 and H(0;m) < 0, it
follows that pL(m) < pL(n).
By Lemma 2, pL(m) is smaller than pM too. Suppose, by contradiction,
there is a price ^ p < pL(m) such that
H(^ p;1) > H(pL(m);m): (20)
Since H(¢;1) is quasi-concave on (0;P), pL(m) 2 (^ p;pM) implies that
H(pL(m);1) ¸ minfH(^ p;1);H(pM;1)g = H(^ p;1). Hence, using (20),
H(pL(m);1) > H(pL(m);m). Moreover, since H(pL(m);m) = 0,
mH(pL(m);m) = H(pL(m);m). Therefore,
H(pL(m);1) > mH(pL(m);m): (21)
Given that H(¢;1) ¡ mH(¢;m) is continuous on [0;P), the expressions
in (18) and (21) imply that there is a price p® 2 (pL(m);pL(n)] such that
H(p®;1) ¡ mH(p®;m) = 0: (22)
By Lemma 7, there exists ² > 0 small enough with the property that H(p®¡
²;1) ¡ mH(p® ¡ ²;m) < 0. But then, using (21) once again, it follows that
there is a price p®+1 2 (pL(m);p®¡²) such that H(p®+1;1)¡mH(p®+1;m) =
0. And repeating the argument over and over again, we get a sequence of
prices fp®+sg1
s=1 ½ (pL(m);p®) with the property that for all s = 1;:::;1,
H(p®+s;1) ¡ mH(p®+s;m) = 0: (23)
Notice that each term p®+s of the sequence is closer to pL(m) than what
it was p®+s¡1. Therefore, invoking Lemma 7 together with the expressions in
(21) and (23), we conclude that for some s ¸ 1 su±ciently high, there must
exist ² > 0 and a price ¹ ¹ p 2 (pL(m);p®+s ¡²) for which H(¹ ¹ p;1)¡mH(¹ ¹ p;m)
is simultaneously positive and negative, a contradiction. This contradiction
was obtained by assuming the existence of a price ^ p < pL(m) that veri¯es
(20). Hence, for all ^ p < pL(m), H(^ p;1) · 0 = H(pL(m);m).
24Let pL(m¤) ´ minfpL(s);s 2 f2;:::;ngg. Clearly, pL(m¤) · pL(m).
Thus, since by de¯nition H(pL(m¤);m¤) = 0, for all ^ p · pL(m¤), H(^ p;1) ·
0 = H(pL(m¤);m¤). Next, suppose, by contradiction, there exists s 2 fm¤+
1;:::;ng such that H(pL(m¤);s) > 0 = H(pL(m¤);m¤). Since H(0;s) < 0
and H(¢;s) is continuous on [0;P), there must exist p0 2 (0;pL(m¤)) such
that H(p0;s) = 0, contradicting the de¯nition of pL(m¤). Therefore, for all
s 2 fm¤ + 1;:::;ng, H(pL(m¤);s) · 0.
Finally, we claim that the strategy pro¯le p = (p1;:::;pn) 2 [0;P)n,
with the property that (i) for all i = 1;:::;m¤, pi = pL(m¤), and (ii) for
all j = m¤ + 1;:::;n, pj > pL(m¤), constitutes a PSBE for Gn. Indeed,
if i 2 f1;:::;m¤g, then ¼i(pi;p¡i) = H(pL(m¤);m¤) = 0. Consider a
deviation ^ pi 6= pi for ¯rm i. If ^ pi > pi, then ¼i(^ pi;p¡i) = 0. Instead, if
^ pi < pi, then ¼i(^ pi;p¡i) = H(^ pi;1) · 0, where the last inequality follows
from the fact that, according with the analysis in the previous paragraph,
for all ^ p · pL(m¤), H(^ p;1) · 0.
On the other hand, if i 2 fm¤ + 1;:::;ng, then ¼i(pi;p¡i) = 0. Again,
consider a deviation ^ pi 6= pi for ¯rm i. If ^ pi > pL(m¤), then ¼i(^ pi;p¡i) = 0.
If ^ pi < pL(m¤), then ¼i(^ pi;p¡i) = H(^ pi;1) · 0. Lastly, if ^ pi = pL(m¤), then
¼i(^ pi;p¡i) = H(pL(m¤);m¤ + 1), which we have already shown is smaller
than or equal to 0. Therefore, p = (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn). And, since
pL(m¤) · pL(n),
P
i2N qi(p1;:::;pn) = m¤ D(pL(m¤))
m¤ ¸ D(pL(n)).
Now, let's prove the second part of Theorem 1. That is, let's show that
if B(Gn) 6= ;, then the assertion \the cost function C(¢) is subadditive at
every output q 2 [D(pL(n));K)" is false. Clearly, if S(Gn) 6= ;, the result
follows from Proposition 2. Hence, assume S(Gn) = ;.
Fix any equilibrium pro¯le p = (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn) and suppose, by
contradiction, there is a ¯rm k 2 N whose reported price pk < pj for all
j 2 Nnfkg. Without loss of generality, denote by ph, h 6= k, the second
smallest price; i.e., let ph = minfpj; j 6= kg. Then,
(a) If pk > pM, ¯rm k can pro¯tably deviate to the monopoly pro¯t-
maximizing price pM;
(b) If pk = pM, Assumption 5 and the continuity of H(¢;1) at pM imply
that there exists ² > 0 such that H(pk ¡ ²;1) > 0. Thereby, since
¼h(p1;:::;pn) = 0, ¯rm h can do better by proposing pk ¡ ² instead
of ph, a contradiction;
25(c) Finally, if pk < pM, depending upon the location of ph the following
happens. If ph > pM, ¯rm k can pro¯tably deviate to pM as before.
Otherwise, if ph · pM, then by Assumption 5 there is ² > 0 such
that H(ph ¡ ²;1) > H(pk;1) = ¼k(pk;p¡k), which contradicts that
(p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn).
Hence, using (a){(c), we conclude that if (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn) and
S(Gn) = ;, there must be at least two ¯rms which tie at the lowest price,
say p¤, and another ¯rm proposing a price above p¤.17 That is, there must
exist m 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g, n > 2, and p¤ 2 [0;1) such that (i) for all
i 2 fi1;:::;img ½ N, pi = p¤; and (ii) for all j 62 fi1;:::;img, pj > p¤. By
following the same reasoning as in (a) and (b), it is easy to see that p¤ < pM.
Notice that, since S(Gn) = ;, H(pL(n);n) < H(pL(n);1), which implies
that H(pL(n);1) > 0. Thus, given that H(0;1) = ¡C(K) < 0, it follows
that pL(1) < pL(n). We show next, using the argument behind the proof
of Lemma 3, that pL(m) · pL(1). In e®ect, assume, by contradiction,
pL(m) > pL(1). (Recall that by Lemma 2 pL(m) · pM.) By Assumption 5,
H(pL(m);1) > H(pL(1);1) = 0. Thus,
H(pL(m);1) ¡ H(pL(m);m) > 0: (24)
On the other hand,
H(0;1) ¡ H(0;m) = ¡C(K) + C(K=m) < 0: (25)
Therefore, from (24) and (25) and the continuity of H(¢;1) ¡ H(¢;m) on
[0;pM], there has to be a price p® 2 (0;pL(m)) such that
H(p®;1) ¡ H(p®;m) = 0: (26)
Recall that, at the equilibrium (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn), m ¯rms tie at the
lowest price p¤; hence, H(p¤;m) ¸ 0. Otherwise, any of these ¯rms can prof-
itably deviate to P. Moreover, p¤ ¸ pL(m) because H(¢;m) is negative be-
low pL(m). In addition, (p1;:::;pn) 2 B(Gn) implies H(p¤;m) ¸ H(p¤;1),
which is equivalent to H(p¤;1) ¡ H(p¤;m) · 0. Thus, using (24), we con-
clude that p¤ 6= pL(m). Finally, by Assumption 5, H(pM;1)¡H(pM;m) > 0.
17Recall that, since by supposition S(Gn) = ;, at most n ¡ 1 ¯rms can tie at p
¤.
26Therefore, there exists a price p¯ 2 [p¤;pM) such that
H(p¯;1) ¡ H(p¯;m) = 0: (27)
Summarizing, by assuming that pL(m) > pL(1), (26) and (27) indicate
that the curves H(¢;1) and H(¢;m) must intersect each other at least twice
on (0;pM). An argument analogous to that used in the proof of Lemma
3 shows that this assertion is false. (The proof is available upon request.)
Thus, pL(m) · pL(1). Furthermore, pL(m) < pL(n) because we already
showed that pL(1) < pL(n). Consequently, D(pL(m)) > D(pL(n)).
So, it remains to be proved that C(¢) is not subadditive at D(pL(m)).
To do that, note that H(¢;1) is negative below pL(m), because pL(1) ¸
pL(m). That means 0 = mH(pL(m);m) > H(pL(m);1), which renders the





< C(D(pL(m))). Therefore, C(¢) is not
subadditive on [D(pL(n));K).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
The proof is based on Panzar (1989, pg. 25). Fix any q > 0 and assume
AC(¢) is decreasing through q. Consider any division q1;:::;qn of q with the
property that: (i) 8i 2 N, 0 · qi < q, and (ii)
P
i2N qi = q. Let N+ = fi 2
N : qi > 0g. Then, for all i 2 N+, AC(q) < AC(qi), which is equivalent
to C(qi) > (qi=q) ¢ C(q). Summing over N+, we have
P
i2N+ C(qi) > C(q).
Therefore, since C(0) ¸ 0, it follows that
P
i2N C(qi) > C(q). Finally, since
q1;:::;qn was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that C(¢) is subadditive at q.
To show that subadditivity does not imply decreasing average costs,
consider the cost function C(q) = 1=2 ¢ q2 + 100 for all q ¸ 0. It is easy to
see that AC(¢) is not decreasing at q = 15. However, if n = 2, then C(¢) is
subadditive at 15.
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